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Abstract 
 
European Union (EU) countries offer a unique experience of financial regulatory and 
supervisory integration, complementing various other European integration efforts following 
the Second World War. Financial regulatory and supervisory integration was a very slow 
process before 2008, despite significant cross-border integration, especially of wholesale 
financial markets. However, the policy framework proved inadequate in the context of the 
major financial crisis in the EU starting in 2007, and especially in the euro area after 2010. 
That crisis triggered major changes to European financial regulation and to the financial 
supervisory architecture, most prominently with the creation of three new European 
supervisory authorities in 2011 and the gradual establishment of European banking union 
starting in 2012. The banking union is a major structural institutional change for the EU, 
arguably the most significant since the introduction of the euro. Even in its current highly 
incomplete form, and with no prospects for rapid completion, the banking union has 
improved financial supervision in the euro area and increased the euro area’s resilience. 
Asian financial integration lags well behind Europe, and there is no comparable political and 
legal integration. Nevertheless, Asia can draw useful lessons from European experiences in 
multiple areas that include the harmonization of the microprudential framework, proper 
macroprudential structures, and participation in global financial authorities. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
European Union (EU) countries offer a unique experience of integration among 
sovereign nations, including regulatory and institutional integration of financial services. 
Driven by the desire to bring peace, security, stability, prosperity, and cohesion for  
their citizens after two devastating world wars, a growing number of European 
countries decided to pool sovereignty to an increasing extent. Starting with the 1952 
establishment of the European Coal and Steel Community by six founding members, 
various policy areas were integrated throughout the subsequent decades, leading  
to the current EU with 28 members. 1  A major step in the process  
was monetary integration with the introduction of a common currency, the euro, in 
11 countries in 1999, with eight additional countries joining between 2001 and 2015.  
Financial integration of European economies started with growing trade integration, 
various financial regulatory initiatives from the late 1970s, and the scrapping of capital 
controls by participating European nations from the late 1980s. While financial 
integration made progress, financial supervisory and regulatory institutions remained 
national, with limited efforts to cooperate and share information. Even monetary 
unification in 1999 was not accompanied by the establishment of supranational 
institutions for financial supervision and resolution, even though there was a clear logic 
for it (Folkerts-Landau and Garber 1992; Schoenmaker 1997).  
While robust financial supervisory integration did not appear politically feasible in 
economically good times, the euro-area crisis that intensified after the great financial 
crisis of 2007–2009 made such a move the most palatable option to preserve the 
integrity of the euro area and to restore financial stability. There were deeper roots to 
the euro-area crisis, which, most likely, would have materialized even without the 
turmoil that came from the US subprime market (Darvas 2012). But the transatlantic 
financial disruption of 2007–2009 created an uncertain global environment, weakened 
all European economies (even those that had comparatively sustainable economic 
models), and led to an acute financial and sovereign crisis in the euro area. While 
some institutional developments for improved cross-border supervision of financial 
services in the EU as a whole were decided in 2009, shortly after the collapse of 
Lehman Brothers in 2008, and implemented in 2011, the biggest institutional 
development was the establishment of the European banking union for euro-area 
countries (Véron 2015). Euro-area heads of state and government decided at a summit 
on 28–29 June 2012 to establish the banking union, at the height of the euro-area 
crisis. The banking union created a truly supranational arrangement for banking 
supervision, centered on the European Central Bank (ECB), which in November 2014 
officially assumed supervisory authority over all banks in the euro area, with 
operational delegation to national authorities for the supervision of smaller banks. This 
centralization of bank supervision was followed by new arrangements for bank 
resolution, which have been mostly in place since January 2016. Additionally, a  
euro-area-wide common deposit insurance system is currently under discussion. A 
number of other initiatives for the financial sector are also being considered under the 
umbrella framework known as the Capital Markets Union (CMU), even though current 
CMU reforms do not involve changes to the financial architecture (Véron 2016) and 
therefore are not described in any depth in this paper.  
1  The UK vote to leave the EU on 23 June 2016, “Brexit,” has not happened yet, and it is not certain that it 
will happen, though it appears likely; if it does, its eventual form is not clear enough to be included in the 
analysis developed in this paper.  
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The goals of this paper are to review recent developments in the EU’s financial 
supervisory and regulatory architecture, to assess its strengths and weaknesses, to 
draw out lessons for regional financial regulatory architecture in Asia, and to highlight 
ways in which Asian financial regulatory and supervisory cooperation could be 
strengthened and improved. While the focus of the paper is on the EU’s financial 
supervisory and regulatory architecture, this must be put into the broader context of 
various regulatory initiatives that are intended to make European financial institutions 
and markets more stable, resilient, and supportive of economic development. 
2. THE PRE-CRISIS FINANCIAL LANDSCAPE 
IN EUROPE 
2.1 Early Financial Regulatory Milestones 
A number of prominent European-level financial services laws have shaped the 
financial landscape in Europe:2  
(i) The First Banking Directive (77/780/EEC, December 1977) provided a single 
definition of credit institutions and outlined principles of non-discrimination to 
enable establishment of cross-border branches.  
(ii) The Second Banking Directive (89/646/EEC, December 1989) harmonized 
bank authorization rules, stipulated capital requirements, and allowed  
banks licensed in an EU country to lend through branches throughout the  
EU that would be subject to home-country authority for most purposes 
(exceptions cover liquidity regulation and oversight, monetary policy, and 
reporting requirements).  
(iii) The Investment Services Directive (93/22/EEC, May 1993) introduced a 
“European passport” (dismantling existing legislative barriers to cross-border 
activity), harmonized capital requirements for investment banking firms, and 
included specific provisions for stock exchanges and other regulated markets.  
(iv) The Financial Services Action Plan (communication from the Commission 
COM (1999) 232, May 1999) was a comprehensive reform program that led to, 
among other initiatives:  
a. the Regulation on International Accounting Standards (EC 1606/2002,  
July 2002), which paved the way for adoption and implementation of 
International Financial Reporting Standards in the EU;  
b. the Markets in Financial Instruments Directive, known as MiFID 
(2004/39/EC, April 2004), which built on the 1993 Investment Services 
Directive to establish the legal basis for EU-wide competition between 
trading platforms and replaced the former national stock exchange 
monopolies;  
c. the first Capital Requirements Directive (actually two separate texts, 
2006/48/EC and 2006/49/EC, June 2006) transposing the Basel II Accord 
of 2004 into European legislation; and  
d. the Solvency 2 Directive (2009/138/EC, November 2009, but started long 
before the start of the global financial crisis) creating a comparable 
regulatory framework for insurance and reinsurance companies.  
2  See Rodriguez (1994) for more details on the first three items. See OEE Etudes (2009) for details on 
the fourth item, the Financial Services Action Plan. 
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2.2 The “Lamfalussy” Financial Regulatory  
and Supervisory Architecture 
While financial supervision remained exclusively national while the above-listed efforts 
at financial regulatory harmonization were being implemented, some efforts were made 
to improve coordination among national supervisory authorities. In 2001, a high-level 
group headed by former central banker Alexandre Lamfalussy delivered a report 
(European Commission 2001) that provided the basis for the so-called “Lamfalussy 
process,” implemented in 2001 for securities and markets regulation and in 2004 for 
banking and insurance supervision. The goals were to adapt financial regulation to 
allow a higher level of financial integration and to adapt it to market developments. The 
Council of the European Union (or “Council”) 3  agreed on the need to provide 
convergent regulation and supervision standards. This framework involved four levels 
of decision making:4 
• Level 1: principles-based legislation, setting broad legislative principles and 
addressing the issues that are to be decided by the European Parliament 5  
and the Council under the EU legislative procedure known as co-decision 
(“ordinary legislative procedure”); 
• Level 2: implementing legislation, in the form of technical implementing 
measures that should be aimed at ensuring a high degree of harmonization and 
flexibility in the regulatory framework. To draft the technical implementing 
details set forth broadly in the Level 1 legislation, the European Securities 
Committee was created, with a primarily regulatory function under Article 202 of 
the EU Treaty. Additionally, the Committee of European Securities Regulators 
(CESR), a Level 3 committee (see below), had an advisory function at Level 2, 
in addition to its role of coordinating the implementation of EU securities 
regulation at Level 3. Similar bodies were later created for banking and 
insurance supervision (see the Level 3 description below);  
• Level 3: regulatory and supervisory coordination, focused on a greater level of 
cooperation between national supervisors. Three so-called Level 3 committees 
of national authorities were created to facilitate such coordination: the 
Committee of European Securities Regulators (CESR), the Committee of 
European Banking Supervisors (CEBS), and the Committee of European 
Insurance and Occupational Pensions Supervisors (CEIOPS). Each of these 
Level 3 committees relied on a small secretariat, respectively located in Paris 
for CESR, London for CEBS, and Frankfurt for CEIOPS. The committees 
comprised the relevant national authorities (including central banks in the case 
of CEBS) of all EU countries, observers from the European Economic Area 
(Iceland, Liechtenstein, and Norway) and the European Commission in CESR 
and CEIOPS, and the European Central Bank in CEBS (with the European 
Commission having observer status); and 
3  The Council of the European Union (“Council” for short) is composed of the relevant ministers of EU 
member states—finance ministers in the case of financial regulatory decisions. Confusingly, the Council 
is a separate arrangement from the European Council, which includes the head of state or government 
of each EU member state, the European Council president, and the president of the European 
Commission. See www.consilium.europa.eu/en/home (accessed 28 October 2016). 
4  See a diagram summarizing these four levels on page 6 of the Lamfalussy committee final report 
(European Commission 2001). 
5  Members of the European Parliament are elected by EU citizens every fifth year. 
3 
 
                                               
ADBI Working Paper 615 Darvas, Schoenmaker, and Véron 
 
• Level 4: control of compliance and enforcement, intended to ensure greater 
enforcement of EU laws, with the main role being played by the European 
Commission as the guardian of the treaties. 
These tangled arrangements highlight the hybrid role of the European Commission, 
which combines executive, legislative, political, and administrative features. Its role in 
the regulation of financial markets includes preparation of EU legislative proposals  
for the European Parliament and Council, and participation in discussions about 
legislative proposals between EU member states, European institutions, and other 
relevant stakeholders.  
Moreover, the European Commission is the competent authority in enforcing the EU’s 
competition policy framework for major cases with cross-border impact, while national 
competition authorities have jurisdiction over local cases (for example, mergers of 
domestic companies with no international activity). Competition policy has become a 
very important part of the EU financial policy framework, especially (but not only) 
through the EU’s mandate to check state aid. Since 1999, a string of landmark 
decisions by the European Commission to enforce competition policy rules in the 
financial sector, and in particular to allow the cross-border acquisitions of financial 
institutions that domestic authorities tried to prevent, has played a crucial role  
in ensuring the integrity of the EU’s single market and in fostering cross-border 
financial integration. 
3. RECENT CHANGES TO THE EUROPEAN UNION’S 
FINANCIAL SUPERVISORY AND REGULATORY 
ARCHITECTURE 
3.1 Changes to the European Supervisory Architecture,  
2009–2011 
3.1.1  Microprudential Supervision: The European Supervisory Authorities 
The recent changes to the EU’s financial architecture were prompted by the great 
financial crisis of 2007–2009 and the subsequent euro crisis of 2010–2012. In October 
2008, the European Commission appointed a group chaired by former managing 
director of the International Monetary Fund (IMF), Jacques de Larosière, to give advice 
on the future of European financial regulation and supervision. The resulting “de 
Larosière report” (EC 2009) concluded that the supervisory framework needed to be 
strengthened to reduce the risk and severity of future financial crises. It recommended 
creating three European supervisory authorities (ESAs): one for the banking sector 
(European Banking Authority), one for the securities sector (European Securities and 
Markets Authority), and one for the insurance and occupational pensions sector 
(European Insurance and Occupational Pensions Authority). These three new ESAs 
replaced the Lamfalussy Level 3 committees (CESR, CEBS, and CEIOPS) and were 
established in the same locations (respectively Paris, London, and Frankfurt). 
The de Larosière report also recommended establishing a European Systemic Risk 
Board (ESRB) to monitor and assess potential threats to financial stability that arise 
from macroeconomic developments and from developments within the financial system 
as a whole (see details in section 3.1.2). 
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The underlying rationale for setting up the ESAs was to ensure closer cooperation and 
better exchange of information between national supervisors, to facilitate the adoption 
of EU resolutions to cross-border problems, and to advance the coherent interpretation 
and application of rules (De Haan, Oosterloo, and Schoenmaker 2015). By preparing 
uniform standards and ensuring supervisory convergence and coordination, the ESAs 
were intended to shape the further development of a “single rulebook” applicable to all 
28 EU countries and thus contribute to the single market. The three ESAs and the 
ESRB started their operations in January 2011. 
The powers assigned to the ESAs include the following: 
• developing draft technical standards, guidance, and recommendations; 
• resolving cases of disagreement between national supervisors, where 
legislation requires them to cooperate or to agree; 
• contributing to ensuring the consistent application of technical rules of EU law, 
including through peer reviews; and 
• a coordination and enforcement role in emergency situations.  
Figure 1: The European Supervisory Authorities Work Closely  
with National Supervisory Authorities 
 
EBA = European Banking Authority, EIOPA = European Insurance and Occupational Pensions Authority,  
ESMA = European Securities and Markets Authority, NSA = National Supervisory Authority. 
Source: De Haan, Oosterloo, and Schoenmaker (2015). 
The de Larosière report envisaged a European system of financial supervision (ESFS) 
that would comprise the three ESAs, a joint committee to coordinate them, the ESRB, 
and all participating national authorities. The ESFS would foster the replacement of  
the EU’s hodgepodge of partially harmonized national financial-sector regulations  
with a genuine single rulebook. Figure 1 illustrates the functioning of the three ESAs, 
highlighting that they work closely with the national supervisory authorities. As such, 
this network combines nationally based supervision of firms with coordination at the 
European level to foster harmonized rules, coherent supervisory practices, and 
enforcement. Through the joint committee, the three ESAs cooperate and ensure 
consistency in their practices. Therefore, while the three ESAs are not supervisors as 
the name “European Supervisory Authorities” misleadingly suggests (except the 
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European Securities and Markets Authority’s direct supervisory role discussed below), 
they contribute more effectively to the consistency of European supervisory practices 
than the previous Level 3 committees of the Lamfalussy framework could.  
In addition to this indirect supervisory impact, the European Securities and Markets 
Authority also exercises direct supervisory authority over a limited set of regulated 
financial firms with a pan-European profile, namely credit rating agencies and trade 
repositories. This direct supervisory role may be expanded in the future toward other 
market segments, such as financial market utilities, but there are no current plans  
to do so. 
3.1.2  Macroprudential Supervision 
One of the main lessons from the 2007–2009 global financial crisis was that the 
supervisory arrangements then in place overemphasized the supervision of individual 
firms, and underemphasized the supervision of the financial system as a whole 
(macroprudential supervision) (De Haan, Oosterloo, and Schoenmaker 2015). The 
interconnections between institutions might lead to system-wide risks that are not 
internalized by them. Financial institutions have correlated balance sheets resulting 
from the similarity of their asset portfolios, because of the interconnectedness  
within networks that creates the potential for quick contagion, and because of the 
potential fire sale of assets that can take place during stress episodes (Claeys and 
Darvas 2015). 
Macroprudential policy could play a key role in ensuring system-wide stability, by 
increasing the resilience of the financial system and by taming the financial cycle with 
targeted tools. More specifically, Smets (2014) suggested that macroprudential policy 
should have four intermediate targets:  
(i) mitigate and prevent excessive credit growth and leverage,  
(ii) mitigate and prevent excessive maturity and liquidity mismatch,  
(iii) limit excessive exposure concentrations, and 
(iv) limit bailout expectations. 
Blanchard, Dell'Ariccia, and Paolo Mauro (2013) suggested that macroprudential tools 
can be roughly divided into three main categories: 
(i) tools seeking to influence lenders’ behavior, such as time-varying capital 
requirements, leverage ratios, or dynamic provisioning;  
(ii) tool focusing on borrowers’ behavior, such as ceilings on loan-to-value or  
debt-to-income ratios; and 
(iii) capital controls, known as “capital flow management tools,” that target hot 
money flows.  
While macroprudential policies are relatively new and mainly under construction, the 
recent literature assessing these measures has found some encouraging results. In 
particular, a number of papers show that carefully set limits to ratios such as the  
loan-to-value and debt-to-income ratios could help to tame financial imbalances.6 
A major advantage of these tools is that they can be applied to a particular sector 
affected by financial imbalances, for instance, the real estate sector. In the euro-area 
6  See, for example, Borio and Shim (2007), Lim et al. (2011), Igan and Kang (2011), Jiménez et al. 
(2012), Kim (2013), Cerutti, Claessens, and Laeven (2015), and Kuttner and Shim (2016). 
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context, these tools have the additional advantage that they can be tailored to  
country-specific circumstances, while the ECB’s monetary policy can only consider the 
euro area as a whole. 
In order to strengthen supervisory arrangements on both sides of the Atlantic, the  
EU and US authorities established new bodies responsible for macroprudential 
supervision, i.e., the ESRB in the EU and the Financial Stability Oversight Council in 
the US. Moreover, at the global level, G20 leaders in 2009 established the Financial 
Stability Board as a successor body to the prior, more limited Financial Stability Forum. 
The ESRB is responsible for the macroprudential oversight of the EU’s financial 
system, defined as contributing to the prevention or mitigation of systemic risks  
that arise from developments within the financial system and taking into account 
macroeconomic developments, in order to avoid periods of widespread financial 
distress. 
The ESRB comprises a general board as its decision-making body, a steering 
committee that sets the agenda and prepares the decisions, a secretariat, and 
technical and scientific advisory committees. While all relevant stakeholders are 
represented within the ESRB, a prominent role has been granted to central banks,  
i.e., most of the voting members of the general board are central bank representatives, 
the chair is the ECB president, and the ECB also provides the secretariat along with 
analytical, statistical, administrative, and logistical support to the ESRB. 
The ESRB’s tasks include the following: 
(i) collection and analysis of all information relevant for macroprudential oversight; 
(ii) identification and prioritization of systemic risks; 
(iii) issuance of warnings where such risks are deemed to be significant; 
(iv) issuance of recommendations for remedial action, and monitoring of measures 
taken in response to warnings and recommendations; 
(v) cooperation with the ESAs, including the development of indicators of systemic 
risk and the conduct of stress-testing exercises; 
(vi) issuance of confidential warnings on emergency situations addressed to the 
European Council; and 
(vii) coordination with the IMF, the Financial Stability Board, and other 
macroprudential bodies. 
Although ESRB recommendations are not binding, the parties addressed are obliged to 
respond under the principle of “comply or explain.” In other words, they must follow the 
recommendation, or explain why they are not doing so. 
3.2 The Establishment of the European Banking Union  
3.2.1  Rationale 
The notion of a banking union explicitly appeared on the EU policy agenda only in  
the first half of 2012, following numerous earlier calls by economists and analysts  
(see, for example, Véron 2011). At that time, the intensification of the euro-area crisis 
necessitated bold measures to counter the increasing market pressure being felt by 
several interlinked banks and euro-area sovereigns, and the increasing financial 
fragmentation, which created a risk of major negative impacts on the economy of the 
euro area and beyond. Several observers questioned whether the euro would survive 
7 
 
ADBI Working Paper 615 Darvas, Schoenmaker, and Véron 
 
the crisis. In this disorderly environment, the idea of a banking union offered a 
politically more acceptable option compared with other alternatives, such as the 
issuance of Eurobonds (joint and several liabilities of euro-area member states)  
and a more rapid move toward a full-fledged fiscal union. The European Council of  
28–29 June 2012 marked the start of Europe’s banking union (the expression itself 
became widely used in the spring of 2012, but was endorsed by the European Council 
only later in 2013), most consequentially by deciding to shift bank supervisory authority 
from the national to the European level, under a framework labeled the Single 
Supervisory Mechanism, also known as European Banking Supervision. 
The explicit motivation for this landmark decision was to “break the vicious circle 
between banks and sovereigns.” National bank resolution regimes and the  
home-country bias in banks’ government-bond holdings imply that there is a correlation 
between banking and sovereign debt crises, which in the euro area context became 
increasingly disruptive. When a government gets into trouble, so does the country's 
banking system (e.g., Greece). And a failing banking system can worsen the 
government’s budget because of a potential government-financed bank bailout, which 
comes on top of a higher budget deficit resulting from the economic downturn caused 
by the banking crisis (e.g., Ireland and Spain).  
Merler and Pisani-Ferry (2012) documented that most euro-area countries were 
characterized by the large size of their banks’ portfolios of domestic government bonds, 
which were markedly larger than in the UK or the US. Moreover, during the crisis this 
vulnerability increased, because all vulnerable countries saw a decline in the share of 
government debt held by non-residents. Germany, by contrast, saw an increase in the 
share held by non-residents.  
This lethal correlation between banks and sovereigns, or “doom loop” or “vicious circle” 
as it is frequently referred to, was a key reason for the initiation of the banking union. 
The 29 June 2012 Euro Area Summit statement started with the words: “We affirm that 
it is imperative to break the vicious circle between banks and sovereigns.” 
At a more fundamental level, the creation of the banking union was a response to  
the mismatch between the integrated European banking market and the largely 
national sector-specific banking policies, including for prudential supervision and  
crisis management. The combination of cross-border banking and national supervision 
and resolution leads to coordination failure between national authorities, which 
(understandably) put national interests first. This in turn can undermine fair competition 
between banks in different countries, lead to suboptimal resolution decisions, and 
might put financial stability at risk. Completion of the banking union would solve  
this coordination failure through the adoption of supranational banking policies. The 
coordination failure argument is related to the single EU market (which allows 
unconstrained cross-border banking), and thus to the EU as a whole, beyond the euro 
area (Schoenmaker 2015; Véron 2015). 
Consistent with this pan-EU rationale, the legislation establishing the banking union 
(described below) left the door open for non-euro-area EU members to join without 
adopting the euro as their currency (i.e., without joining the euro area). Thereby, the 
coordination failure problem could be addressed in the EU as a whole, should  
non-euro-area members decide to join the banking union through the process referred 
to in that legislation as “close cooperation.” Since the banking systems of most  
non-euro-area EU countries are highly integrated with the euro-area banking system, 
entering the banking union could be beneficial for those countries. It could improve  
the supervision of cross-border banks, ensure greater consistency of supervisory 
practices, and provide ample supervisory information, thereby increasing the quality of 
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supervision, avoiding competitive distortions, and fostering financial integration (Darvas 
and Wolff 2013; Hüttl and Schoenmaker 2016). Figure 2 shows that in most non-euro 
EU members, a very large share of domestic banking assets is owned by subsidiaries 
and branches of EU banks, which are predominantly euro-area banks.  
Figure 2: Share of Total Bank Assets from Foreign-Owned  
Branches and Subsidiaries, 2015 
 
* = current member of the euro area. 
Source: Bruegel using data from the European Central Bank.  
A simplified, but widespread descriptive framework holds that a complete banking 
union should be composed of the following elements: 
(i) uniform regulation, including detailed technical standards (“single rulebook”); 
(ii) a single mechanism for bank supervision; 
(iii) a single mechanism for bank resolution; 
(iv) a single deposit insurance scheme; and 
(v) a common fiscal backstop for bank resolution and deposit insurance. 
Such a system is intended to address the bank-sovereign vicious circle in the  
following ways:  
(i) Regulation would (a) make creditor participation in bank resolution (“bail-in”) 
the rule, leaving public sector support (bailout) to unusual and extraordinary 
occasions, thereby reducing the potential cost of banking crises to the 
taxpayer; and (b) set limits on bank holdings of domestic government bonds, 
thereby reducing the channels through which a sovereign debt crisis can 
spread to a banking crisis. 
(ii) Consistent supervision would improve the quality of banking oversight and 
thereby reduce the probability of bank failures, on the basis that national 
supervisors tend to be more lenient with domestic banks than supranational 
banks (Véron 2015).  
(iii) Consistent resolution would reduce cross-country coordination failures, make 
resolution more effective, and better enforce the common rules than in a purely 
national framework.  
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(iv) A common deposit guarantee would increase trust in bank deposits, thereby 
reducing bank funding costs and the probability of bank runs, and thus 
enhancing financial stability. 
(v) Systemic banking crises cannot be completely excluded, even though their 
probability can be reduced by strict regulation and supervision. Moreover, even 
under an effective resolution system and strong bail-in rules, the need for 
public sector support cannot be fully excluded. But if public sector bank 
recapitalization or a top-up to the national deposit guarantee fund, when 
needed, would be financed by the domestic government, then banking woes 
could spread to the public sector, thus reviving the bank-sovereign vicious 
circle. By contrast, if a common fund steps in under such situations, then the 
costs are spread across the banking union area (risk sharing) and the spectre 
of banking troubles spreading to domestic public finances is significantly 
reduced. A final element is thus a centralized fiscal backstop to the common 
fund. Deposit insurance funds typically have a credit line from the government 
(Gros and Schoenmaker 2014).7 
Furthermore, a consistent and rigorously implemented system involving these five 
aspects might also change bank behavior by limiting undue risk taking and bailout 
expectations, thereby reducing the risk of bank failures. 
3.2.2  The Current Architecture of the Banking Union 
In contrast to the above-described complete banking union, the current architecture is 
incomplete. It can be summarily described as nearly complete in terms of regulation 
and supervision (though without the above-suggested sovereign exposure limits),  
but with a lopsided and untested resolution framework, no European-level deposit 
guarantee, and no explicit European-level financial backstop.  
In terms of legislation, the European act for European Banking Supervision (or SSM 
Regulation) was enacted on 15 October 2013 with unanimous support from all EU 
countries. The Single Resolution Mechanism (SRM) Regulation was enacted on 15 
July 2014. A proposal for a European deposit insurance scheme was published by the 
European Commission on 24 November 2015, but is still far from being finally adopted. 
The ECB assumed supervisory authority on 4 November 2014, when it became the 
single licensing authority for all banks in the euro area and the sole authority to 
approve their changes of ownership and new management. The ECB directly 
supervises 129 “significant institutions”—broadly speaking the largest ones, based on 
criteria set by the SSM regulation8—and oversees the supervision of more than 3,000 
“less significant institutions” by national supervisors (referred to in the banking union 
jargon as national competent authorities). Figure 3 illustrates the framework.  
7  Moreover, centralized supervision is consistent with a centralized fiscal backstop: to the extent that the 
centralized supervision is responsible for the bank failure, the costs of such a failure should not be 
charged only to the home country of the bank. 
8  Four criteria are considered for the assessment of whether a financial institution is significant: (i) size 
(the total value of its assets exceeds €30 billion); (ii) economic importance (for the specific country or 
the EU economy as a whole, including if it is one of the three most significant banks established in a 
particular country); (iii) cross-border activities (the total value of its assets exceeds €5 billion and the 
ratio of its cross-border assets/liabilities in more than one other participating member state to its total 
assets/liabilities is above 20%); and (iv) direct public financial assistance (it has requested or received 
funding from the European Stability Mechanism or the European Financial Stability Facility). The status 
of banks may change and the ECB conducts regular reviews of all banks authorized within the 
participating countries. See more information at https://www.bankingsupervision.europa.eu/banking/ 
list/criteria/html/index.en.html (accessed 28 October 2016). 
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Figure 3: European Banking Supervision 
 
Source: Schoenmaker and Véron (2016). 
In contrast to the highly centralized scheme adopted for European banking supervision, 
the resolution framework created by the SRM Regulation entails a complex, and as yet 
entirely untested, division of responsibilities between European and national 
authorities. The SRM Regulation established a Single Resolution Board (SRB), with 
staff located in Brussels, which has a central (but far from exclusive) role in resolution 
decision making and manages a Single Resolution Fund (SRF). Despite its name, the 
SRF is initially established as a series of national “compartments” coexisting with a 
mutualized fund, and is expected to eventually become entirely mutualized among all 
euro-area member states only after a lengthy transition period that runs until 2024. The 
resolution process is governed by newly harmonized (and also largely untested) 
legislation that covers the entire EU, not just the euro area, known as the Bank 
Recovery and Resolution Directive (BRRD).9  
3.3 An Early Assessment of European Banking Supervision 
Key provisions of the BRRD and of the SRM Regulation entered into force only  
in January 2016; at the time of writing, the SRB has not taken any resolution decision, 
making it too early to assess the new European banking resolution framework. By 
contrast, European banking supervision has now been in place for almost two years 
and can thus be subjected to an early, if inevitably tentative, assessment.  
Such an assessment is inevitably constrained by the obvious fact that, while 
supervisory failures can be very visible (and costly), supervisory successes are 
intrinsically difficult to observe or interpret. We offer two approaches in this section: one 
based on the qualitative and narrative review of supervisory practices developed in 
Schoenmaker and Véron (2016), and the other based on the observation of 
quantitative outcomes that bear a connection with supervisory processes. Both 
approaches have limitations, like the dependence of the first approach on perceptions, 
while the banking union in itself is not the sole determinant of the indicators listed for 
the second approach. Yet keeping these limitations in mind, they together provide an 
indication of the strengths and weaknesses of the current form of the banking union.  
  
9  Available at http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/en/TXT/?uri=CELEX%3A32014L0059 (accessed  
28 October 2016). 
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3.3.1 Bank Supervision Practices 
Schoenmaker and Véron (2016) assessed the practice of European banking 
supervision under the SSM Regulation in its first 18 months of operation, i.e., from 
November 2014 to May 2016. Based on the detailed chapters discussing the 
functioning of the SSM in nine countries and the editors’ overall own analysis, 
Schoenmaker and Véron (2016) reach the following key conclusions:10 
• European banking supervision is effective. Supervision of cross-border 
banking groups in the euro area is conducted in a joined-up manner that 
contrasts with the previous fragmented, country-by-country practice. The key 
mechanism is the operation of joint supervisory teams, which for each 
supervised banking group enable information sharing between the ECB and 
relevant national supervisors while providing a clear line of command and 
decision making. The size of the teams (up to several dozen examiners) also 
allows for specialization on topics such as capital and governance. 
• European banking supervision is tough, at least when it comes to 
significant (larger) banks. It is generally more intrusive than previous national 
regimes, with supplementary questions during investigations and more on-site 
visits. The ECB is less vulnerable to regulatory capture and political 
intervention. An early quantitative indication is that the ECB has not shied away 
from increasing capital requirements by imposing higher capital add-ons under 
its Supervisory Review and Evaluation Process (SREP). Fewer changes have 
been introduced so far for the supervision of less significant banks, which still 
varies significantly in different countries, but appears generally less demanding 
than that of significant banks. 
• European banking supervision appears to be broadly fair, at least for 
significant banks. Among these, we have not found compelling evidence of 
country- or institution-specific distortions or special treatment by the ECB,  
for example, in the determination of SREP scores. The situation is more 
complex when it comes to less significant banks that remain subject to national 
supervision, including those tied together in what EU legislation calls 
institutional protection schemes. 
• European banking supervision makes mistakes. There have been cases  
of overlapping and redundant data requests. The ECB’s communication on 
Maximum Distributable Amounts was ill-prepared and contributed to volatility on 
bank equity markets in early 2016. The Supervisory Board appears to act as a 
bottleneck in some procedures and does not optimize its use of delegation for 
day-to-day decisions.  
• European banking supervision is insufficiently transparent. The ECB’s 
Supervisory Board and SREP process are seen as black boxes by numerous 
stakeholders. Banks complain about the opacity of the determination of SREP 
scores, which are based on multiple factors. European banking supervision still 
provides pitifully little public information about all supervised banks, in stark 
contrast to US counterparts.  
  
10  Excerpt from Schoenmaker and Véron (2016). 
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• European banking supervision has not yet broken the bank-sovereign 
vicious circle and created a genuine single banking market in the euro 
area. Many lingering obstacles to a level playing field are outside European 
banking supervision’s remit, including deposit insurance, macroprudential 
decisions (beyond banking), and many other important policy instruments that 
remain at the national level. But even within its present scope of responsibility, 
European banking supervision maintains practices that contribute to cross-
border fragmentation, such as the imposition of entity-level (as opposed to 
group-level) capital and liquidity requirements, or geographical ring-fencing, and 
the omission of geographical risk diversification inside the euro area in stress 
test scenarios. It has not yet put an end to the high home bias toward domestic 
sovereign debt in many banks’ bond portfolios. Nor have many cross-border 
acquisitions been approved by ECB banking supervision so far.  
Developments since June 2016 (when Schoenmaker and Véron 2016, was published) 
have not materially modified this assessment, but highlight the challenges faced by  
the ECB in maintaining high supervisory standards. In particular, the banking sector 
fragility in Italy, which was mentioned in the June assessment, remains a major 
concern that the ECB has not yet been able to address comprehensively. Despite 
ongoing market concerns about the sustainability of the business model of Deutsche 
Bank, at the time of writing, there is no indication of a failure by the ECB in its 
supervision of that systemically important institution, which is the euro area’s  
third-largest bank by total assets. Nevertheless, choices made by the ECB during the 
stress testing of Deutsche Bank and of several dozen other EU banks in the early 
summer of 2016 were questioned by the media as possibly denoting favorable  
special treatment.11 
3.3.2  Outcomes 
The results of a round of stress testing published in late July 2016 suggest that  
the banking system is much more resilient than in previous years (Table 1). Except  
for Monte dei Paschi di Siena, Italy’s third-largest bank, all banks satisfy Pillar 1 
requirements in the adverse scenario. 
Table 1: Overall Outcome of Recent Stress Tests of European Banks 
  CET1 Ratio before the 
Stress Scenario (%) CET1 Ratio Stressed (%) 
2011 Stress test 8.9* 7.7* 
2014 Stress test 11.1 (9.9) 8.5 (7.6) 
2016 Stress test 13.2 (12.6) 9.4 (9.2) 
Notes: Common Equity Tier 1 (CET1) capital ratio: in the context of Capital Requirements Directive (CRD) IV, a 
measure of capital that is predominantly common equity, as defined by the Capital Requirements Regulation as a 
percentage of risk-weighted assets under CRD IV. The asterisk (*) indicates CT1 (Core Tier 1) ratio (instead of CET1), 
which on average is comprised of 95% CET1. Fully loaded requirements are in parentheses; these are calculated 
without applying the transitional provisions set out in CRD IV. All stress tests have a three-year horizon: e.g., the 2016 
stress test uses 2015 balance sheet data (second column) and reports, among other things, the capital position at the 
end of the adverse scenario, which is 2018 (third column). The same holds for the other tests once the necessary 
changes have been made. The sample differs across years: 95 banks in 2011, 105 in 2014, and 51 in 2016. Pillar 1 
requirements: 4.5% CET1, 6% T1, and 8% total capital ratio. 
Source: European Banking Authority (2016). 
  
11  See Laura Noonan, Caroline Binham, and James Shotter. Deutsche Bank received special treatment in 
EU stress tests. Financial Times. 11 October 2016.  
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Figure 4: Credit Default Swap Spreads of Top Financial Corporations,  
1 January 2008 to 10 October 2016 
 
Note: Abbreviations: DE = Germany, ES = Spain, FR = France, IT = Italy. Average of the top five banks for each 
country. The following banks are included: France: BNP Paribas, Credit Agricole, Credit Lyonnais, Societe Generale, 
Natixis; Germany: Deutsche Bank, Commerzbank, Bayerische Landesbank, Nord LB, Unicredit Bank AG; Italy: 
Unicredit, Unione di Banche Italiane, Banco Popolare, Intensa Sanpaolo, Banca Monte dei Paschi di Siena; Japan: 
Aozora Bank, Mizuho Bank, the BTMBI; Spain: Banco Santander, BBVA, Banco Popular Espanol, CaixaBank, Caja de 
Ahorros y Monte de Piedad de Madrid; UK: HSBC, STD Chartered, Barclays, Lloyds, BK of Scotland; US: Bank of 
America, Citigroup, Goldman Sachs, Morgan Stanley, PNC. 
Source: Thomson Reuters Datastream Professional and Bruegel computations. 
The development of credit default swap (CDS) spreads of banks highlight that 
Japanese and US banks were hit by market turmoil much more than euro-area banks 
in the immediate aftermath of the collapse of Lehman Brothers in September 2008 
(Figure 4). However, while the perceived riskiness of Japanese and US banks 
improved significantly by the second half of 2009, the pressure on euro-area banks 
increased from early 2010, reaching especially high levels in Italy and Spain in  
2011–2012. Market pressure declined after the summer of 2012, when European 
leaders initiated the banking union and ECB President Draghi delivered a landmark 
speech promising “to do whatever it takes to preserve the euro.”12 The decline in CDS 
spreads was especially marked in the second half of 2013 and the first half of 2014, a 
decline in which the development of the banking union has likely played a role. In 2016, 
there was significant volatility and an increase in CDS spreads, not least because of 
12  Verbatim of the remarks made by Mario Draghi at the Global Investment Conference,  
26 July 2012, available at https://www.ecb.europa.eu/press/key/date/2012/html/sp120726.en.html 
(accessed 28 October 2016). 
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the troubles of the Italian bank Monte dei Paschi di Siena, the only bank that failed the 
2016 stress tests (adverse scenario). However, the announcement of a capital plan for 
Monte dei Paschi di Siena improved market sentiment, and CDS spreads fell in late 
July and the first half of August 2016. 
Figure 5 highlights the heterogeneity of the euro area in terms of nonperforming loans 
(NPLs). As highlighted by Schoenmaker and Véron (2016), data are based on national 
NPL definitions that may not be fully harmonized. An increase in reported NPLs  
might signal a deterioration in the quality of loans, but might also result from better 
measurement and curbs on practices variously referred to as loan forbearance, 
“evergreening,” or “extend-and-pretend.” Nevertheless, Figure 5 indicates that the 
share of NPLs is relatively high and rising (or at best, is stable at a high level) in 
Greece, Italy, and Portugal, while in Ireland and Spain NPLs have started to fall 
significantly, suggesting that the major restructuring and recapitalization of their 
banking systems have improved the soundness of banks in these countries. 
Figure 5: The Share of Nonperforming Loans 
 
Note: Quarterly data are not available for Ireland and Portugal in 2008 and 2009 and Germany for all years: for these 
years, the corresponding annual data are indicated in each quarter. For France and Italy, biannual data are available.  
Source: IMF Financial Soundness Indicators database.  
A key question is whether the core business of traditional banking, i.e., supplying the 
economy with credit, has sufficiently resumed. A major problem with the analysis  
of credit developments in the context of the banking union is that credit growth is 
influenced by many factors beyond the behavior of banks, including credit demand, 
which is strongly impacted by current and expected economic activity. In turn, the 
economic outlook depends on various factors other than banking system soundness, 
such as fiscal, monetary, and structural policies, as well as developments in the rest of 
the world. Various monetary policy measures, such as special central bank schemes 
for lending to banks, also influence banks’ ability and willingness to supply credit. The 
availability of alternative sources of finance, such as the substitution of bank loans with 
debt securities, also influences credit developments. Nevertheless, academic research 
suggests that credit supply constraints typically play a major role in weak credit 
performance during financial crises (see Darvas 2013a for a survey). Darvas (2013c) 
concludes that a proper cleanup of the banking system is a pre-condition for the 
resumption of credit growth in the euro area. Bank supervision has a major role to  
play in this bank balance sheet cleanup process. Figures 6–8 relate to credit standards 
as derived from bank lending surveys, actual credit growth, and interest rates on  
bank loans. 
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Panel A of Figure 6 suggests that that credit standards were tightened substantially in 
the euro area, the United Kingdom, and the United States in 2007–2009, but not in 
Japan. Subsequently, credit standards were eased in early 2009 in Japan and the UK 
and in late 2010 in the US. In contrast, in the euro area, credit standards were 
tightened again in 2011–2013, reflecting the difficult position of the euro-area banking 
sector during the euro crisis. More recently, however, credit standards have been 
eased in the euro area, too. The banking union has likely played a significant role in 
this easing.  
Panel B of Figure 6 shows the same data for the four largest euro-area countries. Not 
surprisingly, credit standards in 2011–2013 were tightened most in Italy and least in 
Germany, while France and Spain are in between. However, starting in the third 
quarter of 2014, credit standards eased significantly in Italy. 
Figure 6: Banks’ Net Tightening of Credit Standards Applied to New Loans 
(Weighted Net Percentage of Banks), 2003Q1–2016Q3 
 
Note: Data are represented as a weighted net percentage, that is, the percentage of banks reporting tightening of 
lending standards minus those reporting easing credit standards that are applied to new loans, weighted by the share of 
each bank in the total loan outstanding amount. A value of zero implies credit standards have not changed from one 
period to the next. A positive value represents tightening credit compared with the previous period and a negative value 
represents easing relative to the previous period. 
Source: Bank lending surveys from the European Central Bank and national central banks, US Federal Reserve  
System (Senior Loan Officer Survey), Bank of England (Credit Conditions Survey), and Bank of Japan (Senior Loan 
Officer Survey). 
Figure 7 reports credit growth in three country groups within the euro area: “core” 
(Austria, Belgium, Finland, Germany, and the Netherlands); “mid” (France and Italy); 
and “periphery” (Greece, Ireland, Portugal, and Spain). While there are differences 
within each of these groups, there are even greater differences between groups, 
underlining the heterogeneity of the euro area. In core and mid euro-area countries, 
some credit growth had resumed by late 2014, a development in which European 
banking policies might have played a role. In the periphery, contraction of credit 
aggregates continued, but at a gradually lower rate.  
Following an unsustainable credit boom, which characterized several euro-area 
periphery countries and led to private debt overhangs, a contraction of aggregate credit 
stock is a phenomenon that leads to more sustainable corporate finances. In these 
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countries, the key issue is not the growth rate of the aggregate credit stock, but rather 
whether the process frequently called “zombification” (see, for example, Caballero, 
Takeo, and Kashyap 2008) can be avoided, whereby banks with weak balance sheets 
roll over the dubious loans of their existing clients (instead of realizing further losses) 
and do not grant credit to young and potentially more productive firms. Overall, the 
evidence available suggests that some periphery countries may now have escaped 
zombification (especially Ireland and Spain), but others may still be trapped in a 
“zombie banking” cycle, including Portugal and possibly also Italy.  
Figure 7: Bank Loans to Nonfinancial Corporations, January 2004–August 2016 
(Percent Change Compared with the Same Month of the Previous Year) 
 
AT = Austria, BE = Belgium, FI = Finland, DE = Germany, NL= the Netherlands,  
FR = France, IT = Italy, GR = Greece, IE = Ireland, PT = Portugal, ES = Spain.  
Source: Authors’ calculations using data from the European Central Bank. 
For the same three country groups, Figure 8 shows interest rates on loans to 
nonfinancial corporations. While loan rates were rather uniform across the euro  
area from 2003–2008, the euro crisis, which started to intensify in late 2009, was 
accompanied by a major divergence whereby loan rates, especially in the periphery 
and to a lesser extent in mid countries, increased to values well over the rates in core 
countries. Both financial fragmentation and the increased risk in the periphery countries 
might have contributed to the interest rate divergence. The recent narrowing of the 
spread relative to core countries, in which European banking policies may also have 
played a role, is therefore welcome. 
Next, we look at an indicator of financial integration in the euro area: bank loans to 
domestic borrowers and borrowers in other euro-area countries (cross-border loans). 
Figure 9 shows that loans granted by euro-area banks to residents in other euro-area 
countries almost tripled from 1999 to 2008, whereas loans granted to domestic 
borrowers grew at a lower rate. Since the crisis, however, domestic lending has 
changed little, whereas intra-euro area lending fell rapidly. However, starting from early 
2014, the fall in cross-border lending has stopped and a gradual recovery has started, 
signalling that the financial fragmentation that characterized the crisis years may be 
gradually left behind.  
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Figure 8: Interest Rate on Bank Loans to Nonfinancial Corporations,  
January 2003–August 2016  
(Percent per Year) 
 
AT = Austria, BE = Belgium, FI = Finland, DE = Germany, NL= the Netherlands,  
FR = France, IT = Italy, GR = Greece, IE = Ireland, PT = Portugal, ES = Spain.  
Source: authors’ calculations using data from the European Central Bank. 
Figure 9: Bank Loans to Domestic Borrowers vs. Borrowers in Other  
Euro-Area Countries, January 1999–June 2016  
(1999/01 = 100) 
 
EA = Euro-area countries. 
Source: Author’s calculation based on data from the European Central Bank. 
Lastly, a key issue is whether the banking union was able to lessen the bank-sovereign 
vicious circle, which was the key motivation behind its initiation, as we argued above. 
Assessment of this issue is made difficult by the relatively short time since the inception 
of the banking union, the lack of major sovereign crises, and banking failures, but also 
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by the ECB’s large-scale asset purchases,13 which have exerted downward pressure 
on sovereign and private sector yields.  
Still, it is worthwhile to go through the list of banking union-related factors we put 
forward in Section 3.2.1 that can mitigate the vicious circle: 
(i) Regulation: The BRRD introduces strict rules for the bail-in of bank creditors.14 
These rules, however, have not been fully tested yet. There have been 
attempts to circumvent them (e.g., in Italy), but it is too early to label them 
ineffective or even ill-designed. A separate, but related regulatory challenge is 
the current high exposure of many (though not all) euro-area banks to their 
home-country sovereign, which evidently reinforces the bank-sovereign vicious 
circle. Discussions have started on the possible limitation of such exposures 
through appropriate prudential rules, but they raise thorny political challenges 
and are still at a stage that is far from conclusive. Indeed, the large home bias 
in banks’ holdings of debt securities has only marginally declined in Italy and 
Spain and was practically unchanged in Portugal, as indicated by Figures 61 
and 63 of Darvas et al. (2015). 
(ii) European banking supervision is in place and has improved the quality of 
banking oversight, as argued above. Thereby it reduces the probability of  
bank failures. Moreover, the ECB conducted a comprehensive assessment of 
the banking system before it formally started its supervisory function in October 
2014: in anticipation of the results of this assessment, several banks increased 
their capital position, which has contributed to banking sector soundness. And 
as mentioned above, more recent stress tests in 2016 suggested that all tested 
banks (except Monte dei Paschi di Siena) have broadly adequate capital even 
in an adverse scenario, which may be viewed as suggesting that financial 
resilience has improved. All these factors contribute to reducing the probability 
of a vicious circle originating from banking failures. On the other hand, as 
observed by Schoenmaker and Véron (2016), the SSM maintains practices 
that contribute to cross-border fragmentation, such as the imposition of entity-
level (as opposed to group-level) capital and liquidity requirements, or 
geographical ring-fencing, and the omission of geographical risk diversification 
inside the euro area in stress test scenarios, which are certainly not helpful in 
the context of the bank-sovereign vicious circle. 
(iii) The SRM is in place, but as mentioned above, has not yet been tested. Within 
the SRB, the chair and executive members at the center can press ahead for 
resolution measures even if the relevant national resolution authority (or 
authorities) are reluctant. But the complex decision-making structure is a 
shortcoming of the new SRM regime (Schoenmaker 2015; Véron 2015). 
Because of the involvement of the European Commission and the Council, 
decision making can easily become protracted while time is of the essence in 
crisis management. Moreover, the process might become politicized, for 
example, when “national banking champions” are the subject of potential 
resolution measures. To close, or restructure, troubled banks with a firm hand, 
more distance from the political process would be desirable. The Federal 
Deposit Insurance Corporation is an example of a well-functioning agency with 
resolution powers in the US, but the SRB is not directly comparable in terms of 
independence and resources, let alone experience. 
13  See details about the ECB’s asset purchases at https://www.ecb.europa.eu/mopo/ 
implement/omt/html/index.en.html (accessed 28 October 2016). 
14  See Darvas (2013b) for a brief discussion of the bailout vs bail-in debate. 
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(iv) The European deposit insurance scheme was proposed by the European 
Commission on 24 November 2015, yet negotiations for it have stalled and we 
see little prospect for a breakthrough in the immediate future.  
(v) Direct recapitalization of banks by the European Stability Mechanism is in 
principle possible, but is so much constrained by guidelines adopted in 2014 
that it may never be used. The SRF is gradually paid-up by contributions from 
banks, but its size remains limited (around €10 billion at the time of writing), 
and it still lacks a credible euro-area-wide backstop. As discussed in section 
3.2, a common backstop is crucial to achieve adequate risk sharing within the 
banking union. 
Therefore, while a number of banking-union-related factors that mitigate the  
bank-sovereign vicious circle have been introduced and are effective, others are 
untested or have a remote prospect for completion. Still, in our assessment, the  
BRRD regulation and the Single Supervisory Mechanism have already made major 
contributions to mitigate this “doom loop.” 
3.4 The Start of Solvency II for Insurers, 2016 
Traditionally, the focus of attention for both academics and policy makers concerned 
with financial stability is on banking. Nevertheless, insurance is also important for 
prudential supervision. In the literature, gross written premiums (GWP) are used as an 
indicator for the geographical segmentation of insurance businesses. Cross-border 
insurance, measured by GWP, amounts to 36% of total GWP in EU countries in  
2012, while the comparable number for banking, measured by assets, stands at  
25% of total banking assets in EU countries (see Figure 2). Figure 10 shows the  
cross-border penetration for individual EU countries. The share of cross-border 
insurance has increased over the last decade, notwithstanding the global financial 
crisis (Schoenmaker and Sass 2016). 
Figure 10: Share of Total Insurance Premiums from Foreign-Owned  
Branches and Subsidiaries, 2012 
 
Notes: Cross-border penetration via branches and subsidiaries from EU and non-EU countries as percentage of total 
gross written premiums. Countries marked with an asterisk (*) are current members of the euro area. 
Source: Schoenmaker and Sass (2016). 
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The European Insurance and Occupational Pensions Authority (EIOPA), the European 
supervisory authority, plays a coordinating role among the national insurance 
supervisors (see section 3.1). With the advance to Solvency II, the new risk-based 
capital framework for European insurers, this coordinating role of EIOPA has  
become even more important. First, EIOPA has a strong role in setting the technical 
standards underpinning Solvency II to ensure a level playing field. Second, EIOPA has 
an advisory role for the approval of internal models under Solvency II. But final 
authority rests with the national supervisors. The design and rollout of an (international) 
insurance group’s internal model are typically done at the head office, whereby the 
home country supervisor takes the lead. But the host country supervisor must approve 
the use of the internal model for the foreign subsidiaries in its jurisdiction. In case  
of disagreement among home and host supervisors in the so-called supervisory 
colleges, EIOPA thus has an advisory role, but the home supervisor has the final say 
(Schoenmaker and Sass 2016).  
The increasing share of cross-border insurance may tilt the supervisory balance from 
coordination towards centralization in an “insurance union” at some future point. EIOPA 
would then be in charge of the supervisory colleges, just as the ECB oversees the joint 
supervisory teams in the banking union. 
4. COMPARISON OF FINANCIAL INTEGRATION IN ASIA 
AND IN EUROPE 
A key difference between Asian and European economies is related to financial 
openness. Figure 11 shows that in most European countries, full capital account 
openness (as measured by the Chinn-Ito index) had been achieved by the early 1990s. 
The laggards were Greece (by 2002) and Cyprus (by 2008), related to their entry into 
the euro area. Germany had a fully open capital account already in 1970. Cyprus 
introduced capital controls in 2012, which is reflected in the index.15 
By contrast, while Hong Kong, China; Japan; and Singapore opted for fully open capital 
accounts decades ago, capital flows are much more restricted in most Asian 
economies. Indonesia and Malaysia also opted for full capital account openness 
around 1990, but there were major and permanent setbacks around the 1997/1998 
Asian crisis. In the Republic of Korea, which is among the most developed nations in 
Asia, there were major restrictions to capital flows for decades (and a temporary 
setback after the 1997/1998 crisis), and after the recent increase, openness remains 
inferior to the openness of European economies. 
  
15  Greece also introduced capital controls in 2015, which is not yet visible, given that the Chinn-Ito index is 
available up to 2014. 
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Figure 11: The Chinn-Ito Index of Capital Account Openness,  
Selected European and Asian Countries, 1970–2014 
 
Source: Updated dataset of Chinn and Ito (2006). http://web.pdx.edu/~ito/Chinn-Ito_website.htm (accessed  
28 October 2016). 
Gross capital flows also tend to be much more significant in Europe than in Asia. 
Figure 12 shows that in the four largest euro-area countries, gross capital inflows and 
outflows typically exceeded 10% of GDP annually, and in some years have exceeded 
20% of GDP. In contrast, in the six Asian countries reported in the chart, gross capital 
flows rarely exceeded 10% of GDP.16 
  
16  We also highlight that Figure 12 indicates the reversal of financial integration in Europe following the 
global and European financial crises of recent years. For example, “liabilities” on the chart indicate 
capital flows related to non-residents. Negative values for liability flows indicate capital inflows by non-
residents, while positive values indicate the withdrawal of earlier inflows by non-residents. Before 2008, 
all liability flows were negative in Germany and Spain (and in most years in the cases of France and 
Italy), but after 2008 there were several years with withdrawals. Such withdrawals are also noticeable in 
Indonesia and Thailand after 1997. Similarly, flows related to assets indicate foreign investment by 
residents, which take positive values when investment is made abroad. But in a number of EU 
countries, after 2008, flows related to assets took negative values, which shows that domestic investors 
withdrew their earlier foreign investments. 
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Figure 12: Gross Capital Flows: Comparison of Some European  
and Asia Economies, 1989–2015 
 
continued on next page 
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Figure 12 continued 
 
Note: In line with the BOP6 manual, negative values indicate capital inflows into the country in question and positive 
values outflows from the country.  
Source: IMF Balance of Payments Statistics (capital flows) and World Economic Outlook database (GDP).  
The differences in the magnitudes of gross capital flows have led to even more 
significant differences in gross foreign assets and liabilities (Figure 13). In France, 
Germany, and Spain, foreign assets and/or liabilities amount to about 200% of GDP, 
and in Italy they are about 150%. By contrast, in Asian countries the shares of foreign 
liabilities tend to be smaller than 100% of GDP, and foreign assets are generally even 
much lower.  
Figure 13: The Stock of Gross Foreign Assets and Liabilities:  
Comparison of Some European and Asia Economies 
(%) 
 
continued on next page 
  
24 
 
ADBI Working Paper 615 Darvas, Schoenmaker, and Véron 
 
Figure 13 continued 
 
Note: NIIP = Net International Investment Position.  
Source: IMF Balance of Payments Statistics (NIIP) and World Economic Outlook database (GDP). 
A further indicator, foreign bank penetration, also suggests that Europe is much more 
integrated than Asia (Figure 13). This indicator is especially high in Emerging Europe, 
yet values for Western Europe are also well above Asian values.  
To summarize, all indicators considered in this section suggest that financial openness 
and integration is much higher in Europe than in Asia. Increased political and trade 
integration, as well as harmonized EU-wide financial regulatory measures and the 
introduction of the euro, have likely boosted financial integration. Full capital account 
openness (as a result of financial regulation) made possible the high level of financial 
integration. In contrast, beyond the increase in trade integration, the other factors were 
not at work in Asia. 
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Figure 14: Foreign Bank Penetration by Region 
(%) 
 
Note: Lending by foreign banks, as a percentage of total bank lending to nonbanks in each country or region. The data 
are for the major countries and regions. In the case of regions, the data for the respective countries in that region  
are aggregated. 
Source: Authors’ calculations based on IMF international financial statistics and Bank for International Settlements 
consolidated banking statistics. 
5. LESSONS FROM EUROPEAN FINANCIAL 
INTEGRATION FOR REGIONAL FINANCIAL 
REGULATORY AND SUPERVISORY ARCHITECTURE 
AND COOPERATION IN ASIA 
Asia is much less financially integrated than Europe, and there is no comparable 
political and legal integration in Asia. Therefore, expectations about possible regional 
financial regulatory and supervisory cooperation in Asia must be realistic; the long 
process of European regulatory and supervisory integration is unlikely to be followed in 
Asia under foreseeable circumstances. Yet we see three main areas in which Asian 
policy makers could draw lessons from European experiences: (i) the need for a 
harmonized microprudential framework, (ii) macroprudential structures, and (iii) Asian 
participation in global financial authorities. 
5.1 A Harmonized Microprudential Framework 
The overview of European financial integration in this paper suggests that the  
starting point for financial policy convergence, with a view toward financial system 
integration, is a harmonized framework of rules and regulations. A sound basis is 
provided by international standard setters, such as the Basel Committee on Banking 
Supervision, the International Association of Insurance Supervisors, and the 
International Organisation of Securities Commissions. Asian countries are now well 
represented in the membership of these international bodies. But global standards  
are often not specific enough to satisfy the requirements of a genuine supranational 
“single rulebook.”  
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Europe has stepped up regulatory harmonization further in a regional setting under  
the leadership of the European Commission, with an increasingly significant role for 
specialized agencies (the three European supervisory authorities: European Banking 
Authority, EIOPA, and ESMAE) and other European-level participants such as the ECB 
for banking policy. Increased harmonization has allowed national supervisors to 
increase the scope for mutual recognition.  
Efforts at regulatory harmonization and mutual recognition in Asia should of course 
consider the realities of the region. At this point, it appears more realistic to envisage a 
web of bilateral or multilateral “equivalency” frameworks than a full-fledged sector-wide 
system of supranational rule making. For example, if a bank or insurer is supervised 
under “equivalent” rules, the host country could accept incoming business from  
banks and insurers supervised in other relevant Asian countries. Such a system of 
harmonization and mutual recognition may help financial integration, while minimizing 
compliance costs for banks with cross-border operations. Further steps in the financial 
regulatory and supervisory architecture might follow the specific patterns of financial 
integration among financial institutions and markets in Asia. 
5.2 A Proper Macroprudential Framework 
There is a growing recognition that healthy individual financial institutions are a 
necessary condition, but are not sufficient to ensure stability of the financial system, 
which has led to renewed interest in macroprudential policies.  
A potential limitation of macroprudential tools is that they can be subject to regulatory 
arbitrage, either by provoking greater cross-border borrowing (Cerutti, Claessens, and 
Laeven 2015) or by migration of activities from banks to the shadow-banking sector 
(Cizel et al. 2016). A case in point is the application of loan-to-value ratios to 
mortgages. While most countries traditionally apply such loan-to-value restrictions  
to banks, mortgages are also offered to retail clients by insurers and pension funds.  
It is thus important that such measures be applied across the financial system  
(ESRB 2016).  
Given that the shadow-banking sector has become one of the main sources of 
systemic risk, one of the main challenges in the next few years will be to find 
instruments that have an impact on the bank-like activities of nonbanks. For instance, 
in the US, the 2010 Dodd-Frank Act widened the remit of the Federal Reserve, allowing 
supervisors from the newly created Financial Stability Oversight Council to oversee 
nonbank financial institutions that they deem to be systemically important. In Europe, 
the creation of the ESRB in 2010 and the delegation of some macroprudential authority 
to the ECB under the SSM Regulation were beneficial, in our view. However, possibly 
because of diverging national interests, macroprudential supervision is awkwardly 
shared between the ECB, ESRB, and national authorities. As highlighted by Darvas 
and Merler (2013), the ECB can apply those tools only to seek to influence lenders’ 
behavior, as categorized by Blanchard, Dell'Ariccia, and Mauro (2013), but cannot 
apply tools aimed at controlling borrowers’ behavior, such as loan-to-value and  
debt-to-income ratios. These latter tools remain in the hands of national authorities. 
The ECB’s limited remit might well be the weakness of the institutional arrangement, 
but the practice of macroprudential policies will show if this limitation is severe or if 
cooperation between the ECB and national authorities, under the watch of the ESRB, 
ensures the proper implementation of the various macroprudential tools. 
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A key lesson for Asia is therefore the need for a proper macroprudential framework to 
increase the resilience of the financial system, to dampen the financial cycle, and to 
stem undue capital flows. Such efforts can also build on the experiences of several 
Asian countries with the adoption of such tools. As Posen and Véron (2015) argue, 
macroprudential tools can be more effective in less open or less financially deep 
economies than in more advanced financial centers. 
5.3 Asian Participation in Global Authorities 
Finally, Asian countries could push for further rebalancing and empowerment of  
global financial standard-setters and authorities (such as the Basel Committee, 
Financial Stability Board, or International Organization of Securities Commissions)  
to foster greater convergence at the global level, from which Asia stands to benefit 
disproportionately. As documented by Véron (2014), Asia is now reasonably 
represented in the membership of most such global bodies, but not so in their 
leadership (let alone their geographical location, which remains overwhelmingly 
European and to a lesser extent North American). Even in terms of membership, 
further adjustments are desirable: for example, with the advent of banking union, it is 
no longer justified that authorities from individual euro-area countries (namely Belgium, 
France, Germany, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, and Spain) continue as full 
members of the Basel Committee in addition to the ECB and SSM. A system of global 
bodies with more balanced representation of stakeholder jurisdictions may in turn be 
given a stronger mandate to set more specific standards, to better monitor their 
implementation, or even in some cases to directly or indirectly supervise relevant 
market participants with a global footprint. The EU experience illustrates how a vision 
of supranational regulation and even of supranational supervision could move from 
being utopian to being realistic in a matter of a few years: as recently as a decade ago, 
the very notion of supranational financial supervision in Europe was typically dismissed 
as a pipe dream, but it is now up and running. While the specific circumstances of the 
European Union have no equivalent in Asia, Asian economies might draw inspiration 
from this experience to consider proactive initiatives to compensate for recent failures 
of leadership of Europe and the US, and to promote a more coherent and credible 
international framework for the effective oversight of an increasingly integrated global 
financial system. 
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